Abstract-In a recent letter, a controlled bidirectional quantum secure direct communication protocol with cluster states was proposed. We analyzed the security of this protocol and found that it is insecure. In the original protocol, a dishonest controller can eavesdrop the secret messages exchanged between the users, and a dishonest user may achieve his communication goal without the permission of the controller. The corresponding two kinds of attack strategies are presented. Finally, we give a feasible improvement of this communication protocol.
message without the permission of the controller by another kind of attack. Hence, the ZH protocol is insecure.
The remainder of this letter is organized as follow. In Sec. II, we give a brief review of the ZH protocol. Then, two kinds of attack strategies and a possible improved protocol are presented in Secs. III and IV. Finally, a short conclusion of this letter is covered in Sec. V.
II. THE ZH PROTOCOL
For convenience, we use the same notation as that in [15] . In the ZH protocol, there are one controller, Charlie, and four users, Alice1, Alice2, Bob1, and Bob2. Like many quantum cryptograph protocols, there exist both classical and quantum channels between Charlie and every user (as shown in Fig.1 ). These two channels can be established via some intermediate nodes (reference nodes or router nodes) in a quantum network (as shown in [15, Fig. 2 ]).
Four-particle cluster states are used as the information carriers transmitted between Charlie and four users, and are described as follows, 
where, |± = 4 2 , · · · , s 4 2N }) to Alice1 (Alice2) simultaneously. Moreover, the message exchanging process is controlled by Charlie. The steps of the ZH protocol are briefly depicted as follows.
Phase A: Preparation and transmission of the signal particles.
Step A.1: Charlie prepares an ordered four-particle cluster state sequence with a length of l = 2N + δ, each of which is in the state | a i b i c i d i , i = 1, 2, · · · , l. After that, he selects randomly δ states as samples using to check the security of the quantum channels in Step A.3, and keeps them untouched. For the remainder 2N states, Charlie performs a certain operation, which is randomly chosen from I = |0 0| + |1 1| and X = |0 1| + |1 0|, on the particles a i and b i .
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Step A.2: Charlie takes one particle from each entangled pair to form four ordered particle sequences:
Then, he sends these four particle sequences to Alice1, Alice2, Bob1, and Bob2, respectively.
Step A.3: To ensure the security of the transmission of the signal particles, these participants perform the following security checking process. First, Charlie announces the positions of the δ samples. For each sample, he tells four users a certain measurement basis, which is chosen from B Z = {|0 , |1 } and B X = {|+ , |− } at random. Second, according to the public message, four users measure the corresponding particles with the announced bases, and publish their measurement results. If there is no eavesdropper, these results must be correlated. Finally, they compare these results, and calculate an error rate. If it exceeds a threshold, the communication will stop. Otherwise, it continues.
Phase B: Precoding and applying the unitary operations.
Step B.1: After discarding δ sample particles, each user reorders the remainder 2N particles and obtains N two-particle groups.
Step B.2: Alice1 (Alice2, Bob1, Bob2) measures the 2N particles in the basis B Z , and records the outcomes
Using the outcomes and classical XOR operation, Alice1 (Alice2, Bob1, Bob2) encodes the secret message S A (S B , S C , S D ), and obtains the final result
At last, these final results are declared publicly. Phase C: Decoding the secret messages.
Step C.1: Charlie announces the unitary operations that he has performed on the first particles of the cluster states in Step A.1. Here, if the operation is I , the corresponding bit
} is declared by Charlie, which will be used to help Alice1 and Bob1 to exchange their secret messages. In the same way, another bit sequence T 2 , which represents Charlie's operations on the second particle, is published.
Step C.2: Based on the public message of his party in Step B.2, that of Charlie in Step C.1, and his own measurement result in Step B.2, each user can deduce the secret message. To illustrate it clearly, Alice1, who wants to obtain the secret message S C , is taken as an example. From the above steps, she gets the public messages R C and T 1 , which are declared by Bob1 and Charlie respectively. Besides that, she has her measurement outcomes O A . In terms of the correlation of the first qubit of the state | and the third one, the following equation can be obtained,
Based on Eqs. (2) and (3), Alice1 calculates
and deduces the message S C sent by Bob1.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS Different from QSDC, there exists a controller besides the users in a controlled QSDC protocol. This implies that some of these participants may be dishonest when considering its security. Moreover, generally speaking, a dishonest participant, who can hide his eavesdropping by cheating others, has more power to attack than an outside eavesdropper [16] - [22] . Thus, we should pay more attention on the participant's attack in discussing the security of a controlled QSDC protocol. In [15] , the authors analyzed the security of the ZH protocol against five common attacks, and showed that it is unconditional secure. But, by studying further, we found that it is insecure against the participant's attack. To illustrate it, two kinds of attack strategies are presented, one is a fake signal particles' attack, the other is a double Controlled-Not (CNOT) attack. In the first attack, a dishonest Charlie can eavesdrop the secret messages by replacing the cluster states with Bell states. Furthermore, a dishonest user can obtain the transmitted secret message without the permission of Charlie by the second attack.
A. Fake Signal Particles' Attack
In the ZM protocol, the positions of the samples are determined by Charlie in Step A.1, though the security checking process is executed in Step A.3. It may provide Charlie a chance to attack this protocol. Suppose Charlie is dishonest (called Charlie*), he may eavesdrop the users' secret messages by the following attack strategy.
Attack I:
Step I.1: In Step A.1, instead of 2N + δ cluster states, Charlie* just prepares δ four-particle cluster states that are regarded as the samples, and obtains four particle sequences, P A , P B , P C , and P D , with a length of δ. Then, he prepares 2N EPR pairs, which are all in the state |ψ + = 1 √ 2 (|00 + |11 ), and takes one particle from each entangled pair to construct two ordered particle sequences F A andF A . At last, Charlie* inserts the particles of P A into the sequence F A randomly, and obtains a fake signal particle sequence A . In the same way, Charlie* generates the other three fake particle sequences B , C , and D .
Step I.2: In Step A.2, Charlie* respectively sends four fake particle sequences A , B , C , and D to Alice1, Alice2, Bob1, and Bob2, and keepsF A ,F B ,F C ,F D in his hand.
Step I.3: In Step A.3, Charlie* announces the positions of the samples. Namely, Charlie* chooses the particles of the sequences P A , P B , P C , and P D as samples. After that, Charlie* and four users utilize these samples to execute the security checking process. Obviously, these samples are exactly in the state | . Thus, the measurement results of four users are correlated no matter what measurement bases they choose. Namely, no error is introduced in this process.
Step I.4: After discarding δ sample particles, the particle sequence in Alice1 (Alice2, Bob1, Bob2) hand is F A (F B , F C , F D ) . So, when one particle of sequence F A is measured by Alice1, Charlie* performs a measurement on the corresponding particle of sequenceF A in the basis B Z . Obviously, Charlie*'s measurement outcome is equal to Alice1's, which implies that Charlie* obtains O A . After the message R A is declared by Alice1, from Eq. (2), Charlie* can easily deduce Alice1's secret message S A . In the same way, the secret messages S B , S C , and S D are eavesdropped by Charlie*.
Hence, Charlie* may utilize the above attack to eavesdrop four users' secret messages without being found. Moreover, the secret messages exchanged between two users do not be disturbed by Attack I if Charlie* declares two suitable fake messages T 1 and T 2 in Step C.1. For example, when the measurement outcomes of Alice1 is different with that of Bob1, Charlie* announces his operation is X. Otherwise, the operation is I . After that, in Step C.2, Alice1 and Bob1 will succeed in decoding the secret messages, which are unaltered and meaningful.
B. Double Controlled-Not Attack
From Eq. (4), it is shown that the message T 1 (T 2 ) is necessary to decode the secret messages S A and S C (S B and S D ) in Step C.2. Since the message T 1 (T 2 ) is just known by Charlie in the ZH protocol, two users are not able to exchange their secret messages if Charlie disagrees and does not announce T 1 (T 2 ). In view of this point, it is stated that this communication task is accomplished only when they get the permission of the controller in [15] .
However, after reexamining the original protocol carefully, we found that this is not the case. If two users, e.g. Alice1 and Bob1, are dishonest (called Alice1* and Bob1*), they may exchange their secret messages without the aid of Charlie. The reason is that, before the message T 1 is declared by Charlie in Step C.1, they can eavesdrop this message by executing the following attack.
Attack II:
Step II.1: Before measuring the signal particles in Step B.2, Alice1* prepares two ancillary particles, e 1 and e 2 , in the state |0 e 1 ⊗ |0 e 2 . Then, she performs the first CNOT operation on the ancillary particles and the signal particles in her hands. Here, the CNOT operation is U 12 = (|00 00| + |01 01| + |11 10| + |10 11|) 12 , where particle 1 is the control qubit, particle 2 is the target one. Suppose that Charlie applies a operation X t 1 j ⊗ X t 1 k on the first particles of one group signal system in Step A.1, where X 0 = I . So, the signal particles are in the state, |S = (X
After the first CNOT operation, the whole quantum system is in the state,
. Finally, Alice1* sends particles e 1 and e 2 to Bob1*.
Step II.2: After receiving two ancillary particles, Bob1* performs the second CNOT operation on these particles and the corresponding signal particles c j and c k . The state |W is changed to,
By measuring the particles e 1 and e 2 in the basis B Z , Bob1* can obtain the messages t 1 j and t 1 k . Moreover, from Eq. (5), it is shown that the signal state |S remains unchanged. Thus, Alice1* and Bob1* may execute Step B.2, then utilize the messages t 1 j and t 1 k , which have not be declared by Charlie, to exchange their secret messages. Namely, they can achieve the private communication task without the permission of Charlie.
Obviously, since Attack II only happens after the security checking of Step A.3, this attack cannot be detected by Charlie. Additionally, in fact, one dishonest user may break the ZH protocol via a modified version of Attack II. Without loss of generality, we can assume that Bob1 is dishonest, called Bob1*. The detailed attack strategy is depicted as follows.
Attack III:
Step III.1: In Step A.2, Bob1* intercepts the particle sequence A when it is sent from Charlie to Alice1. Then, like Alice1* in Step II.2 of Attack II, he entangles his ancillary particles with the signal particles of sequence A by performing the first CNOT operation. Finally, Bob1* transmits the particle sequence A to Alice1.
Step III.2: Bob1* executes the same attack action as that in Step II.2, and obtains the information about Charlie's unitary operation on the first particle in Step A.1. That is, Bob1* eavesdrops the message T 1 that is still kept secret and just known by Charlie.
Step III.3: In Step A.3, according to the legal process, Bob1* measures the sample particles selected by Charlie, and announces the measurement outcomes. Here, based on Eq. (5), we know that the signal state remains unchanged after double CNOT operations. This implies that the sample particles are still in the state | . Thus, Bob1*'s attack would not introduce any error.
Step III.4: When Alice1 announces her final result R A in Step B.2, Bob1* can derive Alice1's secret message S A from T 1 and his measurement outcome O C .
IV. AN IMPROVED PROTOCOL
In this section, we discuss how to improve the ZH protocol so that it can resist the presented attacks. To retain the features of the original protocol, e.g., no encoded particles are transmitted, we aim to modify it as little as possible. The detail steps of the improved protocol are depicted as follows.
Step 1: The controller, Charlie, prepares an ordered fourparticle cluster state sequence with a length of l = 2N + 4δ, in the state
Then, he takes one particle from each entangled pair to form four ordered particle sequences:
Drawing inspiration from [12] , the secret order technology is utilized in the improved protocol. Concretely, Charlie is required to disturb the orders of four particle sequences, and obtains four new particle sequences A , B , C , and D . Meanwhile, he records the rearranged orders of four sequences, which are completely secret to anyone other than Charlie.
Step 2: To ensure the security of the transmission of the particle sequences, Charlie prepares some decoy particles, which are randomly in one of four states, |0 , |1 , |+ , and |− . He inserts these decoy particles into four sequences at random. In this way, four new particle sequences A , B , C , and D are obtained and sent to four users, Alice1, Alice2, Bob1, and Bob2, respectively.
Step 3: After receiving these particle sequences, four users and Charlie execute the first security checking process depicted as follows. At first, Charlie declares the positions and the bases of the decoy particles. Then, four users measure these decoy particles. Finally, in terms of the results and the initial states, Charlie can evaluate an error rate. If it exceeds a threshold, they abort the protocol. Otherwise, after discarding the decoy particles, four users obtain the particle sequences, A , B , C , and D , and continue the protocol.
Step 4: Charlie announces the secret orders of four sequences. According to this message, each user reorders the particles in his hands. In this manner, four ordered particle sequences, A, B, C, and D, are obtained and will be used to communicate the secret messages.
Step 5: To ensure the particles in their hands are indeed in the state | , every user performs the second security checking process based on the correlation of | , which is similar to Step A.3. In this process, each user randomly selects δ particles as samples, and measures each sample particle in a basis, which is chosen between B Z and B X at random. Then, he declares the positions of these samples, and requires the other three users measure the corresponding particles in an appropriate basis. For example, Alice1 measures a sample particle in the basis B X , and asks the other three users measure the corresponding particles in the bases B Z , B X , and B Z respectively. In terms of Eq. Step 6: After discarding the sample particles, each user holds the remainder 2N particles. Executing Steps B.2 and C.2, four users exchange their secret messages two by two. Only one difference is that all t 1 i and t 2 i are 0 and not required to be declared by Charlie, because he did not perform any operation on the signal particles in Step 1.
Next, the security of the improved protocol is analyzed briefly. At first, it is well known that the decoy technology can ensure the transmitted particle untouched, thus Attack III can be detected by the honest user in the first security checking process. Then, since the second security checking process guarantees that the particles in four users' hands are in a genuine cluster state | , the improved protocol can stand against Attack I. Finally, because the secret orders are just known by Charlie, two users can exchange their secret messages only when Charlie announces the orders. Thus, they should get Charlie's permission, which implies that the improved protocol is secure against Attack II.
V. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we reexamined the security of a controlled bidirectional quantum secure direct communication with fourparticle cluster states, and found that there exist some security flaws. Based on these flaws, two kinds of attack strategies are proposed. In the first attack, by transmitting fake signal particles, a dishonest controller may eavesdrop the secret messages exchanged among the users. In the second attack, because there exists a correlation ship between the first and third particles of a four-particle cluster state, by double CNOT operation, the controller's local unitary operation can be deduced before it is announced in the decoding phase. Based on this result, one dishonest user may obtain the secret message without the permission of the controller. At last, a possible improvement of the original protocol is put forward so that it can stand against the presented attacks.
